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Abstract— The 2003 review of the Common Agricultural 
Policy  (CAP)  has  introduced  several  new  policy  tools, 
among which cross-compliance. The introduction of this 
new  policy  entails  production  costs,  along  with  other 
types of costs arising at the farm level: administrative, 
information,  organisational  costs,  called  transaction 
costs.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  determine  the 
nature  of  transaction  costs  and  to  assess  them.  The 
literature on transaction costs in agriculture has, until 
now,  mainly  been  devoted  to  the  voluntary  measures 
implemented  within  the  framework  of  the  European 
agri-environmental  policy.  The  first  part  of  the  paper 
intends  to  use  this  literature  to  apply  the  private 
transaction  costs  analysis  to  the  issue  of  cross 
compliance.  The  second  part  attempts  to  assess  these 
costs. On the basis of a survey conducted in 2006 among 
a sample of 39 farmers from the Midi Pyrenees French 
region,  a  descriptive  statistical  analysis  (Multiple 
Classification  Analysis  -  MCA)  permits  to  associate 
farmer  profiles  with  different  levels  of  incurred 
transaction costs. These profiles reveal the impact which 
the farmers’ responsibilities (professional networks) and 
the  role  of  voluntary  commitments  previously 
undertaken may have on the nature and importance of 
transaction costs. This paper opens up new perspectives 
on  the  adoption  criteria  that  should  be  taken  into 
account  in  the  evolution  of  agri-environmental 
regulations.  It  appears  that  growing  administrative 
requirements could prompt farmers to outsource tasks 
which most of them carry out on their own today. 
Keywords— Cross compliance, Transaction costs, CAP 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The implementation of cross compliance, within the 
framework  of  CAP  Mid-Term  Review,  is  a  tool 
devoted  to  reconciling  agricultural  activities  with 
environmental  protection.  The  full  payment  of 
subsidies  (under  the  “first  pillar”  of  the  CAP)  is 
contingent  upon  the  farmers’  compliance  with  19 
European  directives  and  regulations  (environment, 
food  security,  animal  and  plant  health,  animal 
welfare). It is also subject to the implementation of 
Good  Agricultural  and  Environmental  Conditions 
(GAEC)  concerning  soil  fertility,  defined  by  each 
Member  State.  In  addition  to  these  GAECs  another 
compulsory  measure  consists  in  maintaining  the 
overall permanent pasture area in every Member State. 
It is the first time this type of measures involves all of 
the  farmers  receiving  CAP  direct  payments.  Indeed, 
the EU’s environmental directives were not, until now, 
linked  to  any  particular  agricultural  support  policy, 
and  the  measures  proposed  today  were,  so  far, 
endowed with a voluntary character (within the scope 
of  the  Agri-Environmental  Measures  or  “second 
pillar” AEMs). This is a novel kind of incentive for 
farmers,  which  combines  regulations  with  financial 
sanctions. In the long run, the objective obviously is to 
achieve  a  better  environmental  state  than  through 
voluntary measures, by targeting a higher number of 
farms.  
These new  measures’  efficiency  may  be  analysed 
by  considering  the  farmer’s  cost  of  entry  into  the 
system – or cost of compliance –. This production cost 
is to be compared with the compensation granted or 
with the incurred loss of income. A preliminary work 
has revealed that the incentive incurs such financial 
penalties,  compared  with  the  direct  costs  of 
compliance  that  farmers  should  comply  (Mosnier  et 
al., 2006). Yet, many farmers show scepticism with 
regard to these measures. This opinion certainly arises 
from the uncertainty due to the evolution of the CAP 
and  the  potential  future  reinforcements  of 
environmental constraints are concerned. All farmers 
do  not  have  the  same  capacity  for  overcoming  a 
possible  reinforcement  of  environmental  constraints. 
This capacity is linked to the management of certain 
transaction  costs,  which  differs  from  one  type  of 
farmer  to  another.  Indeed,  besides  production  costs, 
this  new  subsidy  scheme  may  entail  information, 
organisational, or administrative costs as well. Cross 
compliance  brings  into  play  far  more  complex 
relations than a simple transaction between a farmer 
and  the  authorities.  It  involves  a  network  of 
organisations (cooperatives, producer interest groups, 
etc.)  participating  in  this  process.  A  part  of  the 
transaction costs may be borne by these organisations. 
The purpose of this paper is to apprehend the extent of 
such costs and to assess them. 
The first part presents a theoretical approach and a 
method to investigate transaction costs in the scope  of 
cross compliance under the CAP first pillar subsidies. 
In the second part, we suggest assessing transaction 
costs  on  the  basis  of  a  sample  of  farms  from  the 
Lauragais  Tarnais  region.  A  farmers’  typology 
emerges  according  to  the  extent  and  nature  of  such 
costs.  
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II.  TRANSACTION COSTS: THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK AND APPLICATION TO 
CROSS COMPLIANCE 
In this first part, the type of transaction considered 
in the cross compliance scheme of the CAP 1
st pillar 
subsidies  is  characterised,  starting  from  the  existing 
literature on transaction costs.  
A.  Definitions and Concepts  
The  transfer  of  property  rights  associated  with 
economic  activities  entails  implicit  costs,  called 
transaction  costs.  Some  operations  or  transfers  of 
property  rights  cannot  take  place  insofar  as  the 
incurred transaction costs are higher than the expected 
earnings (Coase, 1960). The definition in the case of 
market  transactions  may  be  extended  to  the  various 
forms of transactions whether these take place on a 
market,  via  a  government’s  intervention,  or  through 
institutional arrangements among the parties involved. 
These  transactions  may,  or  may  not,  involve  a 
financial  transfer.  Thus,  transaction  costs  are,  in  a 
more  general  sense,  costs  generated  by  the 
organisation  and  coordination  of  human  interaction 
(Challen,  2001).  Here  we  should  quote  an  older 
literature which classifies transactions into three types: 
i)  bargaining  transactions,  ii)  managerial 
transactions,  when  one  of  the  parties  involved  is 
inferior  or  superior,  and  iii)  rationing  transactions, 
when  one  of  the  parties  involved  is  a  collective 
superior while the other is made up of private agents 
(Commons, 1931).  
In  agriculture,  the  management  of  externalities 
concerning natural resources may be interpreted in the 
light  of  the  rationing  transaction  definition  and 
transaction  cost  theory:  in  most  situations,  there 
cannot be any spontaneous internalisation or transfer 
of  property  rights  between  the  farmers  and  society 
without the intervention of a public authority (Vatn, 
2005).  Generally,  the  situations  of  uncertainty  and 
information asymmetries among agents constitute the 
main  origin  of  transaction  costs  (Vermersch,  1996). 
Until now, the adoption of voluntary AEMs measures 
has  been  widely  explored  as  main  source  of 
transaction  costs  (for  instance,  Ducos  and  Dupraz, 
2005; Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2005; Képhaliacos and 
Robin, 2004). Within the scope of AEMs, information 
asymmetry between the regulator and farmers results 
in  economic  inefficiencies.  Indeed,  if  the  regulator 
were  perfectly  informed  (especially  concerning  the 
costs  involved  for  the  setting  up  of  AEMs  and  the 
efforts  farmers  are  willing  to  undertake),  and  if  he 
could  use  this  information  when  defining  and 
elaborating  the  contracts  offered  to  farmers,  the 
efficiency of such contracts would be improved. 
The case of cross compliance can also constitute a 
rationing transaction incurring new transaction costs.  
In view of showing this, we intend to use the tools and 
methods  developed  within  this  framework  with  the 
aim of extending their application to the analysis of 
cross compliance measures.  
B.  Transaction  Costs  and  Agri-Environmental 
Contracts 
In  the  case  of  agri-environmental  contracts,  the 
transaction between farmers and the government may 
be  viewed  in  two  ways:  i)  farmers  are  sellers  of 
environmental  goods  and  services  bought  by  the 
government, or ii) the transaction involves a change in 
the  farmer’s  practices  which  reduces  negative 
externalities or produces positive externalities. Such a 
transaction  results  in  a  transfer  of  the  rights  of 
property and use of the resources exploited by farmers 
to the whole of society (Grimal et al., 2002).  
Agri-environmental  contracts  are  defined  by 
numerous  characteristics  such  as  the  eligibility 
constraints,  possibilities  of  renegotiation,  training 
possibilities  or  obligations  associated  with  the 
implementation  and  monitoring  of  such  contracts. 
These characteristics give rise to transaction costs not 
only for the farmers themselves, but also for the public 
administration. Two types of transaction costs may be 
distinguished, as follows: 
-  Public  transaction  costs  borne  by  the  State  and 
public service agencies, which may be classified into 
two  categories:  i) fixed  costs linked  to the  system’s 
elaboration,  implementation  and  evaluation,  and  ii) 
variable costs linked to the system’s running such as 
the  examination,  supervising,  monitoring,  and 
payment  of  contracts  (Falconer  and  Whitby,  1999). 
Public  transaction  costs  estimates  reveal  that  the 
European agri-environmental policy is very costly. On 
the other hand, fixed costs permit economies of scale: 
the  more  contracts  or  hectares  under  a  same 
programme, the lower the average cost per contract or 
per  hectare.  Furthermore,  transaction  costs  can  be 
lowered  due  to  the  experience  of  the  administrative 
agents  (and  farmers  too)  who  participate  in  the 
implementation of the programmes. 
-  Private  transaction  costs  borne  by  the  farmers 
themselves, which relate to the search for information 
on the contracts proposed or on the regulations set up,  
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the  administrative  procedures  farmers  need  to  carry 
out,  the  contract’s  negotiation,  as  well  as  the 
implementation and adoption of the new measures in 
force (Van Huylenbroeck et al, 2005). 
C.   Private  Transaction  Costs  (TCs)  in  Cross 
Compliance Implementation  
In the scope of the CAP 1
st pillar cross compliance, 
the commitment made and signed by the farmer (prior 
to its submission to the relevant arbitrating authorities) 
is  equivalent  to  the  creation  of  a  new  transaction  – 
rationing  transaction  –  between  the  State  and  the 
farmer.  The  change  in  policy  generates  additional 
private  transaction  costs  that  are  likely  to  affect 
farmers.  They  need  to  inform  themselves  about  the 
new  regulations,  to  assimilate  the  content  of  the 
measures,  to  implement  and  monitor  them.  So  it  is 
important to determine precisely what these costs are 
and to put forward indicators assessing their influence. 
Farmers’  private  transaction  costs  depend  on  the 
individual characteristics of the farm , of the farmer, as 
well as of the organisational or institutional networks 
in which the farmer is involved (Vanslembrouck et al., 
2002). Traditional  transaction costs can be illustrated 
as: 
Information costs:  time and expenses necessary to 
gather information regarding the new regulations and 
modes of enforcement of cross compliance measures; 
Administrative  costs:  time  spent  in  recording 
practices  and  filling  in  CAP  forms.  Administrative 
costs also include hardware costs and the possible time 
spent on software training; 
Organisational costs: time and expenses entailed to 
comply with the new measures (change in practices, 
need for technical support, organisation of “in-farm” 
administrative tasks, monitoring tasks, etc.). 
Various  indicators  can  be  used  to  determine  the 
importance and nature of these transaction costs :  
The frequency of the steps/transactions undertaken: 
transaction  costs  may  be  reduced  if  the  farmer  is 
already involved in an environmental contract (AEM, 
label for good farming practices, quality certification, 
etc.), inasmuch as specific investments have already 
been carried out, along with the emergence of certain 
“routines” which reduce negotiation and training costs 
(Ménard, 1996); 
The  degree  of  uncertainty  over  the  transactions 
undertaken and, especially, the degree of confidence 
placed in the new CAP; 
Asset  specificity:  for  instance,  the  farm’s  specific 
location  (relief,  climate,  zoning),  characteristics 
(investment  in  terms  of  equipment,  building, 
hardware),  human  capital,  quality  standards  (labels, 
certifications, etc.). 
 
Another source of influence on TCs can be sought 
in  the  governance  structure.  Thus,  the  transaction 
between  farmers  and  the  State  is  a  succession  of 
interdependent  transactions  involving  professional 
organisations,  landowners,  advisers,  and 
subcontractors,  before  and  after  signing  the 
environmental  contract.  According  to  Ducos  and 
Dupraz  (2005),  the  characteristics  concerning  the 
professional environment and partnership of farmers 
have significant effects on transaction costs.  
Two types of partnership may be distinguished: one 
that puts the public authorities and farmers directly in 
touch  (contractual  relationship:  CTE
1,  CAD
2),  and 
another  that  brings  in  collective  players,  entrusting 
them  with  a  more  or  less  important  role  (local 
associations,  farmer  interest  groups,  unions, 
cooperatives,  etc.).  In  the  latter  case,  the  collective 
system  corresponds  to  a  participative  framework  in 
which farmers and other partners may be integrated 
(Képhaliacos  and  Robin, 2004). These  organisations 
support  common  costs  and  thus  permit  to  reduce 
information costs, as well as facilitate the carrying out 
of  administrative  procedures  and  the  negotiation 
process.  
The  second  part  of  this  paper  proposes  to  assess 
private  transaction  costs  arising  from  the 
implementation  of  the  new  CAP  regulations.  The 
purpose is to evaluate whether the existence of local 
coordination favours acceptance of the new policy and 
facilitates the setting up of cross compliance measures.   
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CROSS 
COMPLIANCE-RELATED 
TRANSACTION COSTS IN FARMS 
FROM THE LAURAGAIS REGION 
A  sample  of  39  farmers  from  the  French  small 
agricultural Lauragais Tarnais region is surveyed in 
order to test the indicators presented in the first part. 
Additional  questions  permit  to  reveal  the  farmers’ 
degree of confidence in the new policy (Pascal, 2006).  
All  of  the  answers  collected  have  first  been  the 
subject  of  a  descriptive  statistical  analysis.  This 
analysis, which characterises the sample, also permits 
                                                 
1 CTE Territorial Farming Contract 
2 CAD Sustainable Agriculture Contract  
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to select explanatory variables for the study of private 
transaction costs linked to the enforcement of the CAP 
cross compliance principle.  
A.  Description of the Sample 
Farmer Profiles 
About half the farmers surveyed are 45 years old, 
and more than two thirds of them have a low training 
status.  The  great  majority  of  farmers  (92%)  are 
members of an organisation (cooperative, union, etc.), 
but  only  44%  declare  being  in  charge  within  such 
professional  organisations.  59%  of  them  hold  extra-
professional responsibilities. The farmers’ relationship 
with cooperatives is mostly commercial. Their other 
professional or extra-professional responsibilities give 
farmers greater access to information, which may help 
reduce certain private transaction costs. 
Besides  their  membership  of  a  professional 
organisation, farmers seek advice or different kinds of 
services  from  other  sources.  Cooperatives  and 
professional  organisations  (chambres  d’agriculture) 
provide  them  with  all  kinds  of  information  and 
technical advice through meetings or training sessions, 
datasheets, bulletins, and field days.  
B.  Farm Characteristics  
Farms are divided into three categories: “Cereals & 
Oilseed Plants” (23 farms) (predominant in the area); 
“Breeding  of  Dairy/Beef  Cattle”  (5  farms);  “Large-
Scale  Farming,  Breeding  &  Diversified  Farming” 
(11 farms).  In  the  are,  he  proportion  of  diversified 
farms is high (20%). 
The  data  relating  to  the  farmers’  voluntary 
commitments  before  the  last  CAP  reform  permit  to 
assess  the  frequency  and  stringency  of  such 
commitments. 
Out of all farmers surveyed, more than half (59%) 
have entered into AEMs. The main AEMs contracted 
by  farmers  are  concerned  with  input  reduction  and 
simplified  cultivation.  Besides  these  agri-
environmental  contracts,  numerous  farmers  have 
entered into other types of contracts: More than 50% 
have specific contracts with a local cooperative: from 
simple  cultivation  contracts  (20%)  to  the  farmer’s 
involvement  in  some  quality  process  (30%);  Nearly 
30% of them exhibit recognised signs of quality, such 
as  labels  or  PGIs
3.  Finally,  breeders  are  generally 
committed to codes of good farming practice. 
                                                 
3 PGI Protected Geographical Indication 
C.  Transaction Costs Analysis  
A multivariate analysis (Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis -MCA) permits to examine the correlations 
existing  among  the  various  qualitative  variables 
collected in the survey.  
 
Time Devoted to Cross Compliance Data 
Gathering  
The time farmers devote to gathering information 
on cross compliance is expressed in hours per year. 
Fig. 1 emphasises the relationships between the time 
spent, farmer’s age and responsibilities held. 
 
Fig. 1: MCA - Crossing of the “information search time”, 
“responsibility” and “age” variables 
 
Older farmers (40 years old and over) are inclined 
to  be  more  involved  in  agricultural  and  extra-
professional  organisations  than  younger  farmers. 
Older  farmers  devote  less  time  to  gathering 
information  on  cross  compliance  than  younger 
farmers.  
Farmers who are involved in agricultural or extra-
professional organisations thus have greater access to 
information,  which  enables  them  to  reduce  the  cost 
generated by cross compliance information search. 
Time and Expenditure Devoted to the CAP Form 
Elaboration  
Nearly  60%  of  the  farmers  surveyed  applied  to 
some para-agricultural organisation to fill in their CAP 
form (26%) or to have it checked (33%). The main 
organisation applied to is the Chamber of Agriculture. 
Overall 74% of farmers filled in their form on their 
own (even if they had it checked subsequently).  
moins de 12h
de 12 à 24h






de 40 à 50ans
50ans et plus
Axe 1 (13.4%)
Axe 2 (12.6%) 
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The  MCA  method  brings  to  light  the  links 
between  the  time  devoted  to  the  CAP  form 
elaboration,  the  farmer’s  age  and  type  of 
responsibilities held. Older farmers (45 years old and 
over)  devote  less  time  to  it  insofar  as  they  get 
information and advice via the professional network in 
which they are involved. This argument backs up our 
previous result. 
 
Time Devoted to Practice Recording 
All of the farmers surveyed record their practices 
either on paper (54%) or on electronic format (46%). 
In fact, many of them record their practices on paper, 
on  a  daily  basis,  before  re-transcribing  these  data 
through electronic medium with a view to being more 
credible in the event of control.  
All  of  the  farmers  recording  their  data  through 
electronic medium already had a computer when cross 
compliance came into force, and so did not have to 
invest in hardware. Some of them (5 out of 18) do not 
have any particular software programme and simply 
use an Excel spreadsheet. Those who have chosen to 
record their data via a software programme (13 out of 
18) have had to make some particular investment both 
in terms of training time (1 to 3 days) and software 
acquisition  (subscription,  software  purchase  or 
updates), with variable costs. Practice recording does 
not require the intervention or assistance of any person 
but the farmer himself.  
The  data  relating  to  the  time  spent  on  practice 
recording give some indication of the organisational 
cost this new requirement generates. In order to assess 
whether  the  increase  in  practice  recording-related 
transaction costs diminishes with the farmer’s degree 
of participation in voluntary schemes (such as quality 
contracts),  Tables  1  and  2  below  propose  several 
crossings. 
The  time  devoted  to  practice  recording  is 
negatively correlated with the commitments made by 
farmers.  The  higher  the  requirement  level,  the  less 
time spent on practice recording. Indeed, the farmers 
surveyed  who  follow  specific  requirements  (label-
type, CTE-type) devote relatively much less time to 
recording their practices inasmuch as this has become 
a routine task. 
Table 1 Crossing of the “recording time” and “AEM” 
variables 
AEM contracted  Recording time 
CTE  7 hours/y 
CAD  9 hours/y 
No AEM  16 hours/y 
Table 2: Crossing of the “recording time” and 
“commitment” 
Commitments  Recording Time 
No commitment  12 h/year 
Cultivation Contract with the GCO 
Cooperative  
14 h/year 
Code of Good Farming Practice  12 h/year 
Quality Specifications  9 h/year 
AEM  7 h/year 
 
Time Devoted to the Projected Fertilisation 
Plan Elaboration 
The  Projected  Fertilisation  Plan  (PFP)  concerns 
nearly 77% of the farmers surveyed. For 41% of them, 
this  requirement  does  not  entail  any  specific 
knowledge. Those for whom this measure called for 
specific knowledge (33%) applied to some agricultural 
adviser  from  the  Chamber  of  Agriculture,  without 
there being any particular expenditure involved.   
The correlation between the time devoted to the 
PFP  elaboration  and  age  (and  so  training  status)  is 
strong: younger persons, with a higher training status, 
are likely to have specific knowledge which enables 
them to meet this requirement easily. 
The time farmers spend elaborating the PFP is not 
linked to their involvement in any CTE. The Projected 
Fertilisation Plan was not a requirement until the cross 
compliance  principle  was  introduced.  The  farmers’ 
involvement  in  a  CTE  did  not  specifically  prepare 
them  to  meet  this  particular  cross  compliance 
requirement. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The CAP MTR changes (cross compliance) generate 
additional  private  transaction  costs.  The  purpose,  in 
this paper, was to determine and analyse such costs on 
the basis of a survey conducted among a sample of 
farmers  from  a  small  region  of  Midi-Pyrenees.  The 
results  bring  out  three  types  of  private  transaction 
costs:  i)  information  costs,  connected  with  the  time 
farmers devote to searching for information on cross 
compliance; ii) administrative costs, mainly related to 
the time farmers devote to filling in the CAP form and 
recording  practices;  iii)  costs  arising  from  the 
Projected Fertilisation Plan elaboration.  
The  individual  characteristics  of  the  farm,  of  the 
farmer,  as  well  as  of  the  organisational  and/or 
institutional networks in which the farmer is involved, 
have  an  impact  on  the  nature  and  importance  of  
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transaction  costs.  Two  farmer  profiles  are 
distinguished within the sample. The first corresponds 
to  farmers  who  bear  lower  transaction  costs,  are 
generally  involved  in  an  agricultural  or  extra-
professional network, and are committed to voluntary 
contractual  programmes  (CTE,  label,  code  of  good 
farming  practice,  etc.).  These  “committed”  farmers 
have  broader  access  to  information,  which  enables 
them to reduce the costs arising from cross compliance 
information  search.  Moreover,  the  frequency  of 
contractual  undertakings  and  their  requirement  level 
contribute to reducing the transaction costs related to 
practice  recording  or  the  implementation  of  certain 
cross  compliance  measures.  The  second  profile 
corresponds  to  farmers  who  bear  higher  transaction 
costs,  who  do  not  participate  much  in  professional 
networks, and are not or little involved in contractual 
programmes.  These  farmers  are  mainly  oriented 
towards  the  production  of  cereals  &  oilseed  plants. 
The requirements of cross compliance appear as new 
in  these  systems  and  therefore  call  for  information 
time  and  training.  All  in  all,  it  seems  that  cross 
compliance  implementation  generates  higher 
transaction  costs  for  large-scale  farms  than  for 
breeding farms
4.  
Though  the  results  achieved  can  hardly  be 
generalised  (low  sample),  some  prospective  changes 
may be envisaged in the agricultural sector, involving 
farms, cooperatives, and accompanying organisations. 
If  administrative  requirements  are  to  increase  as  a 
result of future CAP reforms, farmers will be likely to 
outsource tasks most of them carry out on their own at 
present. It could then turn out to be necessary to take 
into  account  all  of  the  farm’s  costs,  as  well  as  the 
impact on the farm’s economic viability. Furthermore, 
there  could  be  repercussions  on  the  activity  and 
viability  of  all  economic  players  and  support 
organisations competing for the provision of services 
to farmers. It then proves useful to continue and refine 
the  analysis  in  the  context  of  the  CAP  evolution. 
Beyond increased requirements for the granting of first 
pillar subsidies, the process of contracting schemes in 
the agricultural sector is likely to spread. 
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